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ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND ITS PLACE IN THE
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
JOHN FREEMUTH*
The National Park Service (NPS), along with other federal land manage-
ment agencies, has been called on to participate in a federal-land policy and
management experiment. A much heralded and so-called new management
paradigm, ecosystem management,' has emerged to capture both the time and
interest of practitioners and scholars of natural resource policy. This essay will
examine the role of ecosystem management within the NPS from the perspec-
tive of public policy and public administration. The paper begins with a brief
look at the development of the first major resource management regime in the
United States. A clear understanding of the development of that regime during
the Progressive Era at the turn of the century is important because it allows us
to compare the style and substance of that early era with today's attempt to
implement ecosystem management. Following this discussion will be a brief
overview of certain key institutional realities within which NPS must function.
The paper then examines the effort to bring ecosystem management to a unit
of the national park system by focusing on the development of the Vision
document and process in and around Yellowstone National Park. Following
that discussion, the current status of ecosystem management is examined, con-
cluding with an analysis of the likelihood of successful implementation of this
confusing, yet interesting, natural resource policy.
THE FIRST GOSPEL: PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION
To some in various government bureaus, ecosystem management has an
almost religious appeal, as it is offered as the answer to a wide range of feder-
al land and resource policy issues and problems. Efforts to bring about ecosys-
tem management have important parallels with an earlier time in natural re-
source policy. NPS personnel, as well as park policy scholars interested in the
implementation of ecosystem management, would do well to revisit the time
of the Progressive Movement for clues as to how to develop and implement a
management regime which came to be accepted by most of American society.
For, if ecosystem management is not accepted by the American public, then it
* Professor of Political Science and Public Administration, Boise State University. B.A.,
Pomona College, 1972; M.A., Claremont Graduate School, 1975; Ph.D., Colorado State Univer-
sity, 1986. The author gratefully acknowledges the following individuals for reading and critiquing
a draft version of this manuscript: Jon Jarvis, Superintendent, Wrangell-St. Elias National Park and
Preserve, Alaska; Neal King, Superintendent, Hagerman Fossil Beds National Monument, Idaho;
and William Supemaugh, Badlands National Park, South Dakota. They represent some of the best
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1. See infra note 89.
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will likely fail.
We recall the Progressive Era as the time of Gifford Pinchot, Teddy Roo-
sevelt, and the growth of the Conservation Movement. It was also the first
time that an attempt was made to develop and apply somewhat universal
principles to the tasks of natural resource management. The Progressive Era
institutionalized expert-centered public land management. The federal bureau
which best represented the Progressive Era in land management is the United
States Forest Service (USFS). Samuel Hays, in his seminal work Conservation
and the Gospel of Efficiency, summarized the beliefs of this time when he
noted that:
Conservationists were led by people who promoted the "rational" use
of resources, with a focus on efficiency, planning for future use, and
the application of expertise to broad national problems. But they also
promoted a system of decision-making consistent with that spirit, a
process by which the expert would decide in terms of the most effi-
cient dovetailing of all competing resource users according to criteria
which were considered to be objective, rational, and above the give-
and-take of political conflict.2
In the case of the USFS, the expertise brought to bear on forest management
questions came, not surprisingly, from the science and profession of forestry.
One important observation, then, is that ecosystem management can be viewed
as a new iteration of the expertise theme of the Conservation Movement, with
other sciences such as ecology taking the place of forestry. The faith in exper-
tise and professional judgement, as it did earlier, remains at the core of eco-
system management.
Perhaps more important about the Conservation Movement, however, may
well be how its themes caught the public imagination. Advocates of ecosystem
management should pay close attention to that earlier time. An article written
about the Vision process in Greater Yellowstone, which took place in the late
1980s, offers us an insight into understanding those earlier successes of the
Conservation Movement.
Shortly after the end of the Yellowstone area Vision process, three Yel-
lowstone National Park officials who were intimately familiar with it wrote
about their grueling effort to manage it. Bob Barbee, John Varley, and Paul
Schullery, in discussing the role of public involvement in the Vision process,
quoted a passage from one of the letters of Teddy Roosevelt: "I want to go
just as far in preserving the forests and preserving the game and wild creatures
as I can lead public sentiment. But if I try to drive public sentiment I shall
fail, save in exceptional circumstances."3 This is a vital observation, because
it reflects Roosevelt's views on how a leader should bring about policy
change, in this case replacing indiscriminate resource use with the new policy
2. SAMuEL P. HAYS, Preface to the Atheneum Edition of CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL
OF EFFICIENCY vii (Atheneum 1980).
3. Robert D. Barbee et al., The Yellowstone Vision: An Experiment That Failed or a Vote




of resource conservation. One might well be able to influence public opinion
regarding policy change, indeed even "lead" public opinion, but one could not
force public opinion where it did not wish to go, as Roosevelt noted. Of equal
importance is the emphasis on engaging the public with proposed policy
changes, rather than merely pronouncing that change will happen.
Roosevelt's closest natural resource advisor also understood this observa-
tion about public opinion. Early in his career, Gifford Pinchot noted that "in
the long run, Forestry cannot succeed unless the people who live in and near
the forest are for it and not against it."' Pinchot, of course, helped lead the
effort for professional management of the national forests. But the key to
Pinchot's success lay not in his advocacy of professionalism and expertise, but
in the service of both to a democratic vision of forests and natural resources.
In the words of political theorist Bob Pepperman Taylor, "For Pinchot, the
conservation of natural resources is of fundamental democratic value because
it allows for the possibility of equality of opportunity for all citizens."' For-
ests were to be managed for the good and the use of all. Taylor added, "If we
remove the vision of Progressive democracy from Pinchot's work, we are left
merely with the scientific management and control of natural resources for no
other purpose than brute human survival."6 It is unfortunately true that later
foresters "became progressively more narrow in outlook as a result of the kind
of specialized education they [Pinchot] encouraged."7 Expertise was on the
ascendancy, while its service to a democratic vision receded. This change was
probably due to the very success of the vision of Pinchot. The point which is
vital is that early public land management was successful as public policy
because of its link to a democratic vision accepted by the majority of society
at that time. As Greg Cawley and I have noted in the George Wright Society
Forum:
The federal lands, whether as national parks, national forests, or eco-
systems, are owned by the American public. But they are also places
in which local communities have developed. In consequence, manage-
ment decisions are as much about defining the character of those
local communities as they are about defining land use practices. It
would be misdirected, of course, to allow local desires to dictate
national policy. However, it is not only misdirected but ultimately
counterproductive to dismiss local concerns as somehow not part of
the public discourse over national policy.
What early conservationists like Pinchot understood was that major
policy shifts required developing a discourse in which scientists, pro-
fessionals, local publics, and national publics could find common
meanings. It was not an easy task, nor did it occur overnight. Never-
theless, conservation did, at least for a time, define a consensus posi-
tion about the management of the federal estate. To expect that the
4. GIFFORD PiNcHcOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 17 (1947).
5. BOB PEPPERMAN TAYLOR, OUR LIMrrs TRANSGRESSED 19 (1992) (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 26.
7. DAvID A. CLARY, TIMBER AND THE FOREST SERVICE 17 (1986).
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changes implied by ecosystem management will be realized without
an equally lengthy and difficult effort is to doom the project to fail-
ure.
8
It is thus clear that Progressive-era public lands management was centered as
much on a vision of what type of society we ought to desire, as it was on an
expert centered land management regime. It was a vision accepted by a major-
ity of Americans, representing an underlying consensus about how a large
amount, but not all, of our federal estate should be managed.
Early national park management history lies within--but not at the center
of-the Progressive realm. On the one hand, Pinchot opposed the notion of a
separate national park bureau, while supporting the damming of Hetch Hetchy
valley in Yosemite.9 The conclusion, obviously, is that appreciating the need
of others for national parks was one of Pinchot's blind spots. Thus, the parks'
democratic qualities spoken about so eloquently by Wallace Stegner were
ignored by Pinchot, because he couldn't conceive of resource preservation for
"enjoyment" as a valid use in his vision of conservation, unless an area was
also open for development at the same time.
On the other hand, the fledgling NPS was not able to institute the strong
educational/professional component which forestry, and a forestry degree,
represented for the Forest Service. Park rangers became known more as "gen-
eralists," and there was no specific educational requirement for new park rang-
ers at NPS. Thus, NPS was not able to obtain the degree of professional au-
tonomy achieved by the Forest Service.
However, the "founders" of NPS management in the post-Organic Act
Era, Stephen Mather and Horace Albright, certainly had a democratic compo-
nent which was central to their strategic vision about the purposes of the early
parks. ° Put simply, the parks were to be used in order to build up a constitu-
ency which would support them and the NPS. That vision was successfully put
into place. Ronald Foresta, in his landmark America's National Parks and
Their Keepers illustrates the power and significance of that earlier vision when
he reminds us that "[a] park is anthropocentric; its special quality comes from
its appeal to humans. It strikes people as grand or sublime, or it just makes
people happy to be there, for whatever reason."" In a later passage, Foresta
offered an insight which proponents of ecosystem management might take as a
warning of a trap to avoid: "By and large, the most vocal advocates of
biocentric management, the environmental activists, have been the most con-
temptuous of the park visitor."'2 In sum, the legacy of the parks has been
their use and preservation vision. One question is whether ecosystem manage-
ment should fit into this policy of use and preservation, or whether it some-
8. John Freemuth & R. McGreggor Cawley, Ecosystem Management: The Relationship
Among Science, Land Managers and the Public, GEORGE WRIGHT F., 1993, at 26, 31-32 (empha-
sis added).
9. HAYS, supra note 2, at 38, 193.
10. See, e.g., R. GERALD WRIGHT, WILDLIFE RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT IN THE NA-
TIONAL PARKS 10-14 (1992).
11. RONALD A. FORESTA, AMERICA'S NATIONAL PARKS AND THEIR KEEPERS 268 (1984).
12. Id. at 270.
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how will alter this policy, without any clear articulation that alteration of park
policy has already occurred. That, of course, depends on who controls the
definition of the term.
Those interested in ecosystem management might also do well to examine
the history of park management and policy development for clues as to any
lessons about what policies have worked and why, as well as for how that
history may provide insights on ecosystem management. One example has just
been provided. Certainly, the extension of the park system into historic preser-
vation, urban parks, and the multiple use national recreation area, suggests that
ecosystem management may play a more central role in some types of units
than in others. Also, those who develop and think about management policy
ought to pay special attention to the successes and failures in implementation
of past policy initiatives such as the Leopold Report," or what has come to
be called by many the "vignettes of primitive America" policy. 4 Observers
of wildlife policy in the national parks have noted that the Leopold Report did
call for an active resource management stance; it was not a laissez faire or a
so-called "natural regulation" approach, as some came to call it.' The point
here is that many aspects of NPS culture contributed to (and continue to con-
tribute to) the role and place of science and resource management within the
bureau, and they have rendered the policy prescriptions made in the Leopold
report, and later reports, more difficult to achieve. How many of those organi-
zational barriers still remain perhaps needs more systematic research, especial-
ly if ecosystem management turns out to be about policy change. Organiza-
tional culture change is difficult enough in the private sector; in the public
sector it may often be impossible. 6
Second, there is a fundamental arbitrariness in the choosing of a certain
time-pre-European settlement, "primitive America"-as some sort of ideal
towards which to manage. The time period is both arbitrary and heavily value-
laden with severe implications for society. Yet such efforts continue, for ex-
ample, with the Forest Service-Bureau of Land Management's Upper Colum-
bia River Basin Ecosystem Management project discussions over returning
part of the Pacific Northwest to "pre-settlement conditions."'" The only way
such a management goal can, and should, be set would be through an active
public dialogue which discusses all of the possible economic and noneconomic
costs and benefits associated with such an approach. Perhaps such an approach
with the context of ecosystem management is more feasible in the units of the
13. ADVISORY COMM. ON WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, A STUDY
OF THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM (1969) [hereinafter Leopold Report].
14. See Douglas 0. Linder, New Direction for Preservation Law: Creating an Environment
Worth Experiencing, 20 ENVTL. L. 49, 58 (1990) (citing Richard W. Sellars, Science or Scenery?
A Conflict of Values in the National Parks, 52 WILDERNESS 29, 30 (1989)).
15. FREDERIC WAGNER ET AL., WILDLIFE PoLcIEs IN THE U.S. NATIONAL PARKS 26-27
(1995).
16. For an excellent introduction to the concepts of organization culture, see generally HAR-
RISON TRICE & JANICE BEYER, THE CULTURE OF WORK ORGANIZATIONS (1993).
17. See, e.g., Henry B. Lacey, New Approach or Business as Usual: Protection of Aquatic
Ecosystems Under the Clinton Administration's Westside Forests Plan, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
309 (1995).
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park system than in multiple-use areas.
LIMrrs TO ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
Natural resource professionals struggle daily with trying to better under-
stand the ecosystem(s) within which their various management units are
placed. Yet it is the institutional setting, within which agencies such as NPS
function, which will have more influence on the development and success of
ecosystem management. For the purposes of this essay, the most important
aspect of that institutional setting is the role of a public sector bureau, NPS, in
American democracy. As surprising as it may seem to some readers, there is
an amazing theoretical and practical uncertainty about what that role should
be. Put simply, there is no mention of the public bureaucracy in the Constitu-
tion-at least in terms that would be recognizable as referring to the large
apparatus of modem government, with its important discretionary powers of
public policymaking. This gap means that there is no clear consensus in politi-
cal theory about the roles and powers of a large section of the modem Ameri-
can state, a section which has come to be as significant as Congress or the
courts. For example, some argue that the bureaucracy must pay due attention
to the demands and requirements of the Congress which created and continues
to fund it. 8  Others argue that bureaucracies have been delegated
policymaking authority and thus may use professional judgement in making
decisions. 9 What, then, is the best way is for NPS to understand and defend
the legitimacy of what it does in the name of park policy? This question de-
serves some consideration as the bureau moves towards ecosystem manage-
ment, or any other policy change for that matter.
EXPERTISE AND SCIENCE
One model of legitimacy which has great appeal to bureau professionals is
built around expertise. NPS decisions have legitimacy because NPS knows the
most about the parks, and has been given that decision-making authority by
Congress.2" Congress created both the parks and NPS, then delegated the
day-to-day management responsibility to the bureau. The bureau uses its pro-
fessional judgement (hence discretion) on how to manage the park system.
This model works well, to a point. Indeed, NPS is constantly at the top of the
most admired federal bureaus, perhaps due in part to what the public asso-
18. See, e.g., Philip Brashier, Comment, The United States Struggles with Past Judicial
Interpretations Defining the Modern Law of Immigration, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1357, 1378 (1996)
("An executive agency... which is supposed to carry out the intent of a congressional statute
must be restricted from overreaching and should not possess greater authority than the President
and Congress.").
19. See, e.g., Clayton L. Riddle, Comment, Protecting the Grand Canyon National Park
from Glen Canyon Dam: Environmental Law at Its Worst, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 115, 126 (1993)
("In 1916, Congress adopted the National Park Service Organic Act ... fully intending the newly
created NPS to coordinate and rationalize America's national park development. Congress envi-
sioned one agency administering existing and future park lands in accordance with a prevailing
feeling that the parks had a necessary place in America's development.").
20. National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
[Vol. 74:3.
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT
ciates with NPS, but also because NPS must be doing a few things right. Yet,
as readers are well aware, there are many NPS decisions which are not left to
the bureau; there is not complete deference to the bureau's expertise because
of that expertise. I have argued elsewhere that many other actors in the politi-
cal system-members of Congress, their staff, political appointees, conces-
sionaires, environmentalists and others-constantly seek to interfere with NPS
decisionmaking'
This "interference" is common to many, but not all, federal bureaus. For
example, Barbara Romzek and Melvin Dubnick once described the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as having what they term a
"professional accountability" system during the 1960s.22 Under this system
"public officials must rely on skilled and expert employees to provide appro-
priate solutions." 3 Under a professional accountability system, the general
public also shows deference to expertise and thus there is not nearly as much
outside interference in bureau decisionmaking.
Even though their histories are different, both NPS and the USFS today
are not expert-centered agencies but more responsive ones. A "responsive
agency," in the words of Romzek and Dubnick, is concerned with questions of
representation, access, and responsiveness to public demands.24 "The potential
constituencies include the general public, elected officials, agency heads, agen-
cy clientele, other special interest groups, and future generations. Regardless of
which definition of constituency is adopted, the administrator is expected to be
responsive to their policy priorities and programmatic needs."'
The notion of bureau responsiveness to other political actors fits our ex-
pectations of democratic theory. We do not expect our public bureaucracies to
do things without taking the opinions and values of others' into their decision-
making calculus. Expectations that ecosystem management will bring about
deference to the expertise of scientifically trained professionals needs to be
understood in this context. If such deference does develop, it will only happen
after a long public discourse with others-a "leading" of public sentiment, to
put it in Roosevelt's terms. 6 That appears to be the "proper" relationship be-
tween expertise and democracy. To phrase it differently, what do resource
managers do if the public decides that ecosystem management is not a worth-
while public policy?
Also, countless examples of expertise/professionalism have lead to bad
decisions, to the point that expertise itself is somewhat suspect in our society
at this moment. Consider the current arguments over forest health. The USFS
is essentially asking the American public to trust it to manage the forests to
make them more "healthy."27 The bureau notes that one reason the forests are
21. John Freemuth, The National Parks: Political Versus Professional Determinants of Poli-
cy, 49 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 278, 281 (1989).
22. Barbara S. Romzek & Melvin J. Dubnick, Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons
From the Challenger Tragedy, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 227, 230-31 (1987).
23. Id. at 229.
24. Id. at 229-30.
25. Id. at 229.
26. See supra text accompanying note 3.
27. See Richard Haeuber, Setting the Environmental Policy Agenda: The Case of Ecosystem
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not healthy is because of the many years of fire suppression.' But wasn't it
USFS who spent years suppressing fire and years telling the American public
that only "they" could prevent forest fires? Now it admits that policy was in
error.29 Can some in the public be blamed for being suspicious of claims of
forest health problems, even if those claims are accurate?
Finally, it is questionable whether many decisions which are presented as
"science-based" (a form of expertise) are that at all. They are often political
decisions at their core. For example, I am sure a science-based strategy could
be concocted to close a good percentage of many of the national parks in the
name of "biodiversity." This would look like a scientific decision but it would
not be. It would be a political decision redefining the mission and purpose of
the parks, without any public discussion of the need or desirability of the
change, with biodiversity as a "scientific stalking horse" for a certain set of
values (diminished resource use) which seek to subordinate other legitimate
public values (public enjoyment, natural resource use) in the name of a scien-
tific imperative. Science and expertise should best be understood in this con-
text then, as necessary but insufficient conditions for providing legitimacy for
NPS decisions. Without "good science," decisions are hard to justify, yet sci-
ence alone cannot make decisions for us.
There may be a more useful way to think about managing parks, however,
which can build on the expertise which NPS has. The 1916 Organic Act'
charges NPS to manage parks "for future generations."31 The clause gives
NPS a focus which is different than all of the other actors who claim to have
an interest, or power, over bureau decisions. It allows NPS to act in the name
of park resources, and in the name of visitor experiences with a long term
"public interest" perspective.32 But, it requires NPS to speak in those terms,
rather than solely in the language of expertise. There is no guarantee, of
course, that NPS perspectives on park management issues will prevail, but
such a public interest perspective is different than a perspective which looks
out for constituents or is based on political ideologies and agendas at play at a
certain time. The future generations who might visit the parks would become a
benchmark by which parks are managed today, and thus this long term per-
spective can legitimately be inserted into debates over park management. Ex-
pertise and science remain necessary tools, however, in this debate. NPS could
then present to its public(s) and other interests management decisions framed
with a long term perspective and designed to help those interests deliberate
over choices NPS must make. Ecosystem management then becomes framed
in terms of the public interest.
Management, 36 NAT. RESOURCES 1, 25 (1996).
28. William Hart, Smokey Bear Changes His Tune, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 16,
1984, at 45A.
29. Id.
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
31. Id.
32. Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of
1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1994).
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CASE STUDY: A VISION FOR THE FUTURE: ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN
GREATER YELLOWSTONE
Ecosystem management first received focused attention by federal land
managers during a symposium held at the University of Washington in the
mid-1980s. 33 A book with a series of articles written by key participants, and
edited by James K. Agee and Darryll Johnson, illustrates the cautious, yet
hopeful, approach taken by those involved with the concept at that time:
Therefore, ecosystem management in parks and wilderness should
explicitly reflect multiple, measurable goals defining both natural
environmental conditions and socioeconomic concerns. These goals
should acknowledge the fact that social values, political pressures,
and biological knowledge may be different ten to twenty years from
now, and that park and wilderness management should be responsive
to such changes within defined legal limits.34
Not too long after the book's publication, the first large scale experiment with
ecosystem management began in the area in and around Yellowstone National
Park.
THE YELLOWSTONE EXPERIMENT
The Yellowstone area has often reflected the most important public poli-
cies about the public lands of the United States. It is, as most readers know,
the location of the world's first national park, so designated by Congress in
1872. 3" The area is also the site of the first national forest of the United
States, proclaimed initially as the Yellowstone National Park Timber Land Re-
serve by President Harrison in 1891.36 We know these places today as inte-
gral parts of our federal lands, managed by the two most prominent land man-
agement bureaus, NPS and USFS. We also know these places as home for the
two dominant approaches to public land management in the United States.
The national parks are viewed as representing the "preservation" approach
to public land management. 7 These lands were often set aside from resource
development and other uses to be "conserved"-interestingly, today we say
33. See supra note 18, at vii. This publication is a collection of papers presented at the Eco-
system Management Workshop, held Apr. 6-10, 1987, at the University of Washington's Pack
Forest
34. James K. Agee & Darryll Johnson, A Direction for Ecosystem Management, in Ecosys-
TEM MANAGEMENT FOR PARKS AND WILDERNESS 229 (James K. Agee & Darryll R. Johnson eds.,
1988).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1994) (setting forth the parameters of Yellowstone, from the Act of
March 1, 1872, ch. 24, § 1, 17 Stat. 32); see also RICHARD A. BARTLETT, NATuRE's YELLow-
STONE 194-210 (1974) (presenting history of the creation of Yosemite and Yellowstone Parks).
36. See Robert B. Keiter, An Introduction to the Ecosystem Management Debate, in THE
GREATER YELLowsToNE ECOSYSTEM: REDEFINING AMERICA'S WILDERNESS HERITAGE 3 (Robert
B. Keiter & Mark S. Boyce eds., 1991).
37. SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POUCY: ITS DEVEL-
OPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 45 (2d ed. 1980); see also STEPHEN Fox, JOHN MUIR AND His
LEGACY: THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT (3d ed. 1982) (relating a biography of John
Muir in the first part of the book, and a chronological history of the Conservation Movement in
part two).
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"preserved"-in more or less a natural state.3" Yet pure protection was not
the goal. These places were also to be visited or "enjoyed" by people, as stat-
ed in the 1916 Organic Act which created the bureau.39 This so-called "use
and conservation" management task facing the NPS has never been an easy
one, and has been well documented.' Yet there is no doubting that the na-
tional park idea well represents the preservation theme in public land manage-
ment.
The other theme is represented by what is known today as the "multiple-
use" approach to land management.' The essence of this approach is that
national forest lands allow for a wide variety of activities, which interestingly
were also viewed as "conservation."42 Those activities can include grazing,
timber harvesting and mining; they can also include wilderness recreation and
scientific research. 3 National forests can include preservation as a. goal, but
they also include a great number of other uses.
There is no better illustration of the importance of these differences than
the ongoing battle over the New World Mine proposal adjacent to Yellowstone
National Park.44 It is clear that bureau differences are well illustrated by the
positions of NPS and USFS on the proposed mine. NPS is opposed, while
USFS is not--they are undertaking various environmental reviews of the pro-
posal. Parenthetically, readers and observers of the debate over this project
might wish to note whether ecosystem management played any role in the
decision process, and how that role compared with the role of laws already in
place which are being used by proponents and opponents of the project. Cur-
rently, ecosystem management does not appear to have played a very major
role. Another case worth examining is NPS/USFS conflict over the protection
of the cave resources in Oregon Caves National Monument.45 Once again,
bureau missions appear to be driving the conflict, rather than ecosystem man-
agement.
Some students of national forest policy have argued that Congress did not
originally intend to create such a clear difference between the management of
the forests and the management of the national parks. Sally Fairfax has effec-
38. Id. at 45.
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
40. See generally Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Eco-
system Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 296-98 (1994) (detailing the history of ecosystem
management and putting forth an agenda for statutory reform thereof).
41. See 3 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW § 16 (1996). This section of the treatise gives a history and analysis of multiple-use, as well
as theorizing on its applicability in the future.
42. Id.
43. See The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1994) (mandating
there be a multiple-use scheme of management utilized on National Forest Service land); DANA &
FAIRFAX, supra note 27.
44. See James Gerstenzang, 2 GOP Leaders Question Cost of Land Swap, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
24, 1997, at A3. For a critique of the current National Forest Service regulations and some sug-
gested reform measures, see generally Joel A. Ferre, Note, Forest Service Regulations Governing
Mining: Ecosystem Preservation Versus Economically Feasible Mining in the National Forests, 15
J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 351 (1995).
45. See Jeff Barnard, Logging Foes are a Mixed Group: Young, Old Protest in Northwest
Woods, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 4, 1996, at B1.
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tively argued the point that "during the 1890s ... both Congress and the pub-
lic viewed parks and forests as interchangeable." 4 It was the somewhat later
influence of Gifford Pinchot that transformed USFS into much more of a
"silviculture regime," as Fairfax puts it.' Scholars, however, continue to de-
bate the role and philosophy of Pinchot; he has also been seen as linking for-
est management to his vision of the public good.'
Readers familiar with public land history, and public land policy, know
that public land law is often ambiguous, contradictory, and inconsistent. Thus
both park and forest management has hardly been uniform or consistent. For
example, the USFS manages several national recreation areas such as the Saw-
tooth, in Idaho, that are almost indistinguishable from some national park
units. The NPS, on the other hand, must manage grazing, mining and even
hunting in some of its units.49 The point, however, is that the two dominant
approaches in United States public land management are found in the Yellow-
stone area.
Although interagency cooperation and communication may lie at the core
of many people's conception of ecosystem management today, such behavior
came relatively recently to Greater Yellowstone. It was not until the early
1960s that the region's managers saw the need for the creation of the Greater
Yellowstone Coordinating Committee (GYCC).5° Today's managers, howev-
er, have noted that "natural resource issues were not a major focus of atten-
tion" during the early days of the GYCC.5
That focus began to change in the early 1970s. Perhaps the most impor-
tant instigator of that change was growing alarm over the status of the grizzly
bear in and around the national park.52 Here was a natural resource issue
which demanded attention. What began to be recognized was that some type
46. Sally Fairfax, The Forest Service/National Park Service Relationships, in PARKS IN THE
WEST AND AMERICAN CULTURE 7 (Inst. of the Am. W. eds., 1985).
47. Id.
48. See BOB PEPPERMAN TAYLOR, OUR LImTS TRANSGRESSED: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICAL
THOUGHT IN AMERICA 18-19 (1992).
49. JOHN FREEMUTH, ISLANDS UNDER SIEGE: NATIONAL PARKS AND THE POLITICS OF EX-
TERNAL THREATS 50-51 (1991) (discussing the implementation of policy, in the form of manage-
ment, in Glen Canyon, Utah).
50. Thomas T. Ankersen & Richard Hamann, Ecosystem Management and the Everglades: A
Legal and Institutional Analysis, I 1 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 473, 521-22 (1996); John Mamma
& Paul Grigsby, A Vision for Yellowstone's Forests, 15 PUB. LAND L. REv. 11, 16 (1994).
51. U.S. FOREST SERV., DEP'T. OF AGRIC. & U.S. NAT'L PARK SERV., DEP'T. OF INTERIOR,
VISION FOR THE FUTURE: A FRAMEWORK FOR COORDINATION IN THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE
AREA (1990) (draft) [hereinafter USFS & USNPS]
52. See Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the Endan-
gered Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 47-48 (1996); Kyla Seligsohn-Bennett, Comment, Mis-
managing Endangered and "Exotic" Species in the National Parks, 20 ENVTL. L. 415 (1990)
(relating the threatened status of the grizzly bear and feral horse to mismanagement by the Na-
tional Park Service and calling for reform in order to attain species preservation); David P.
Sheldon, Comment, A Threatening Turn for a Threatened Species: The Impact of Natural Wildlife
Federation v. National Park Service, 10 PUB. LAND L. REv. 157 (1989) (addressing the policy of
the National Park Service towards the grizzly bear in light of the Ninth Circuit's decision); see
also R. Edward Grumbine, GHOST BEARS: EXPLORING THE BIODIVERSrrY CRISIS (1991) (illustrat-
ing a biodiversity crisis of epidemic proportion using the plight of the grizzly bear in the Greater
North Cascades).
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of "cross-boundary" management was needed, and that the interested public
was increasingly seeing the need for that management as well. 3
A FOCUSING EVENT: THE 1985 HOUSE OVERSIGHT HEARINGS
The problems facing species like the grizzly bear were obvious catalysts
for better coordination. Yet it was most likely the actions of a House subcom-
mittee which precipitated a more rapid response by federal land mangers in
the region. By 1985, Congress had begun to pay attention to the management
of the Yellowstone region. 4 In the fall of that year, the House Subcommittee
on Public Lands of the Interior Committee (now Resources) held hearings on
what was coming to be called by many the "Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem"
(GYE)." It is likely that Congressional concern at that time was in part cen-
tered on what was then called the "external threats" problem to national parks,
rather than an explicit need for ecosystem management.56 For example, in a
report prepared for Congress by the Congressional Research Service (CRS),57
much was made of legal park boundaries said to be inadequate because many
park resources crossed those boundaries.5" Yellowstone National Park was the
"heart" of an area whose plants, water, and wildlife depended on that entire
area.59 That area, not definitively defined, was the GYE. The GYE included
parts of six national forests (Beaverhead, Bridger-Teton, Custer, Gallatin, Sho-
shone, and the Targee), two national parks (Yellowstone and Grand Teton),
two wildlife refuges (the National Elk Refuge and Red Rocks Lake), a small
amount of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land, private land, and was
part of three states.' Coordinating all of these disparate "sovereigns" in the
name of the core values of the heart of the ecosystem would seem a massive
undertaking.
It is essential to closely read the 1985 hearings in light of the later events
surrounding the publication of the Vision document for the GYE. We need to
determine if the members of Congress who were actively involved in the hear-
ings sent a clear message to the NPS and USFS regarding their expectations
for the area. Did, for example, Congress expect merely better interagency
coordination and consultation, or did it expect to see an entirely new manage-
ment approach for the area? Were the members unified in their concerns and
expectations, or were they divided? Did they have a clear understanding of
what constituted a ecosystem?
At the outset of the hearings, Subcommittee Chair John Seiberling (D-
53. Id.
54. See Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub.
Lands and the Subcomm. on Nat'l Parks and Recreation of the Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing].
55. Id. at 1.
56. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ISSUES SURROUNDING THE GREATER YELLOw-




60. Oversight Hearing, supra note 47, at 2-3.
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Ohio) remarked that "the issues that affect the Greater Yellowstone Area are
ones that transcend park boundaries."' He went on to note that the "so-called
Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem is not a statutory or official or even a clear
scientific designation."62 These two introductory remarks suggest both con-
cern with park protection, as well as recognition that the ecosystem concept
remained ambiguous in the mind of Seiberling. Later comments by Seiberling
confirm this assessment that these hearings, in his mind, were about threats to
parks:
When we started out with the National Park Protection Act [in 1982]
we tried to get a system of all the various agencies to coordinate with
the Park Service where there were possible threats to parks. Every-
body objected to that ... and said we ought to do this on a case-by-
case basis. So that is what we are doing.63
Congressman Richard Cheney of Wyoming noted in his opening remarks
that "an effort is going to have to be made by those who would recommend a
change to show that somehow the current system ... is not functioning prop-
erly."
A panel of public land managers was the first group to testify at the over-
sight hearings. William Penn Mott, then NPS Director, stated what might be
viewed as common themes of ecosystem management: "Technically, the eco-
system system should be referred to as a biographic province rather than the
ecosystem. Generally speaking, the art of the ecosystem management is in its
infancy mainly because one must first ask, 'How is that ecosystem defined?
By whom? From what perspective?"' Mott seemed be urging caution in two
directions. First, he questioned the choice of the word "ecosystem." Second,
he drew attention to the fact that the word "management" was fraught with
many conceptual difficulties. The questions Mott asked are at the core of the
debate over ecosystem management. They seek answers that are political at
their most fundamental.
Superintendent Barbee appeared to have trouble with the word ecosystem
as a useful term, noting it wasn't "something you can define definitely, at
least as a practical or pragmatic management tool, but it is a term that we are
having to deal with. I don't think it is going to go away."'' Barbee's observa-
tion on the inadequacy of ecosystem management as a management tool
should be remembered, in light of later events.
PUBLIC COMMENTS
A review of the testimony of interested groups and parties who were in-
vited to testify at these hearings conveys a sense that the groups and individu-
als invited had no uniform sense of ecosystem management. Some, like Franz
61. Id. at 1.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 40.
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
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Camenzind, a private ecologist, envisioned an idealized management regime
where the migratory birds who had winter range in Yellowstone would also
have their summer ranges in the American south protected.67 To him, such a
scenario was possible eventually. "Politically... we cannot accept all of these
areas at this moment for consideration of the ecosystem."' To the president
of the Wilderness Society, William Turnage, the solution was a change in the
management direction of USFS: "The Wilderness Society calls on the U.S.
Forest Service to change its priorities, to make ecosystem protection in the
Yellowstone its highest value rather than taxpayer-subsidized commodity pro-
duction." This comment later led Representative Cheney of Wyoming to ask
Tumage whether he would eventually ban timbering in Greater Yellow-
stone.70 Turnage responded that it was possible "within a decade."'" A 1996
vote by members of the Sierra Club to oppose logging in national forests sug-
gests that intense debate over forest management continues in this direction.72
Christopher Duerksen of the Conservation Foundation supported a pro-
cess-based approach calling for "consensus building in negotiation patterned
after the habitat protection plans of the Endangered Species Act and the Coast-
al Zone Management Act."'73 In testimony. as part of a later panel, Amos Eno,
Director of Wildlife Programs at the Audubon Society, said "we wish instead
to accentuate the positive by focusing on the concept of Yellowstone as an
ecosystem which could be managed within existing governmental frameworks
and statutory mandates. 74
Resource users had other concerns. Brad Penn, representing Rocky Moun-
tain Oil and Gas Association viewed an ecosystem approach as a further limi-
tation of resource development. "[M]ore restrictive management of multiple
use activities would have a devastating impact on local communities and mul-
tiple uses, including oil and gas activities."" In a certain sense, then, both
Penn and Turnage anticipated less resource use as the result of an ecosystem
approach. As Congressman Cheney put it, later in the hearing:
[Miany people perceive it as a way for some of the environmental
groups to seek to pursue a hidden agenda, which is to get ranchers
off the lands, close down timbering, and so forth. I think it is very
important to be precise as to what is intended here .... 7"
Cheney's comments echo those of Director Mott. They also suggest a problem
which may continue to haunt the development and implementation of current
ecosystem management policy. Cheney expressed concern that certain environ-
67. Id. at 90.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 99.
70. Id. at 107.
71. Id.
72. Kim Murphy, Sierra Club Votes to Oppose Logging on Federal Lands; Timber: Action
Is a Turning Point for Moderate Group and Sets Stage for Tougher Bargaining Over U.S. Forests,
L.A. TIMES, April 23, 1996, at 3.
73. Oversight Hearings, supra note 44, at 103.
74. Id. at 138.
75. Id. at 113.
76. Id. at 122.
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mental groups were perceived as using ecosystem approaches as a stalking
horse for other issues. It would seem fair to conclude that in some people's
minds ecosystem management-like regimes meant a curtailment of multiple
use. Thus any definition of what other people would later try to develop for
ecosystem management would be colored by what people already thought it
meant. Had future federal agency efforts already been limited by these percep-
tions?
The 1985 oversight hearings did not lead to a firm conclusion or direction
about the management of the Yellowstone area. As the testimony above indi-
cates, opinion was widespread. To put it another way, these hearings do not
convey any sense of a "mandate" from Congress to the federal land manage-
ment agencies to do anything radically different.
Land managers did however, find further impetus in the hearings for in-
creasing coordination efforts. The impetus had begun earlier that spring, at a
meeting of the Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee where the
"Blackwater Concept" was developed. That concept called for a direction to
interagency coordination including (1) defining the Greater Yellowstone Area,
(2) desired future conditions for the area in the period 1995-2000, (3) what the
area would look like in the years 1995-2000 under current plan implementa-
tion, (4) changes need to reconcile (2) and (3), and (5) actions needed to im-
plement those changes.77
The next stage in the evolution of policy in the Greater Yellowstone Area
(GYA) was the publication of a document which listed all of the federal land
management plans for the region. That document, called the "Aggregation,"
made no policy decisions, but simply provided one place where key aspects of
forest and park plans could be found. It was a precursor to events which
would capture the attention of the nation for a time.
BATTLE OVER THE VISION
The Blackwater Concept led to the creation of a group, or "team", which
would manage the development of a new framework for the coordination and
management of the Yellowstone area. From that document it was hoped that
relevant forest and park plan revisions would be made.
The planning team, headed by Jack Troyer of USFS and Sandra Key of
NPS, developed a public involvement and response process. That process in-
cluded a number of meetings, briefings, open houses and so on. What emerged
was a list of fourteen draft goals written by the forest supervisors and park
superintendents of the region. Those goals became the key components of a
mailing sent to interested members of the public for comment. In addition,
another round of meetings was held. The result was the release of the draft
version of Vision for the Future: A Framework for Coordination in the Great-
77. National Park Service,"Cooperation in the Greater Yellowstone Area," Memo from Di-
rector, National Park Service, to Director, Bureau of Land Management (1986)and Mealey, Steve,
interview with author, (1993). Mealey was Forest Supervisor on the Shoshone National Forest in
1986 and was Supervisor of the Boise National Forest at the time of the interview.
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er Yellowstone Area, in the summer of 1990.8 That document would set the
stage for a major federal land policy battle.
The draft Vision document proposed three primary goals79 for future
management of the GYA on lands under either USFS or NPS administration:
1) Conserve the Sense of Naturalness and Maintain Ecosystem Integrity,' 2)
Encourage Opportunities That Are Biologically and Economically Sustain-
able,8' and 3) Improve Coordination. 2 It then went on to identify numerous
sub-goals and "coordinating criteria." Implementation of this strategy offered
the bureau's promise that the "GYA can serve many people well at the same
time that its fundamental values are adequately protected." 3 Yet, the docu-
ment also recognized that "there will be disputes and controversies over [the
proposed] management direction." 4
Robert Keiter has suggested that the political climate of the GYA has
been shaped by three influences. First, environmentalist pressures to "protect
the ecosystem;" second, fears of traditional multiple-use constituents that their
use might be curtailed; and third, desires by the agencies themselves to assert
better control over the management process (the return of the progressive
model).,5 Traces of these influences are clearly evident in the Vision docu-
ment. For example, the terms Greater Yellowstone Area and Greater Yellow-
stone Ecosystem (GYE) were used interchangeably throughout the document.
Also, the overall approach proposed in the document was described as an
attempt to "pioneer ecosystem management."' These concerns were close to
those expressed by the environmental community. Yet at the same time, they
met the concerns of traditional multiple-users: "Opportunities for recreation
and commodity development, including timber harvesting, grazing and mineral
development will be provided for on appropriate federal lands."" Finally, the
attempt to define and clarify explicit management goals was certainly a step in
the understandable direction of reinforcing agency control over the manage-
ment process.
In short, the draft Vision document appeared to offer a rather sophisticated
response to the political landscape surrounding Yellowstone. However, the
document failed to recognize a fundamental tension in federal land administra-
tion and in consequence it exacerbated, rather than resolved, conflict. As a
78. USFS & USNPS, supra note 23.
79. USFS & USNPS, supra note 51, at iii. An earlier version of this discussion of the Vision
process can be found in R. McGreggor Cawley & John Freemuth, Tree Farms, Mother Earth, and
Other Dilemmas: The Politics of Ecosystem Management in Greater Yellowstone, 6 Soc'Y &
NAT'L RESOURCES 41 (1993).
80. Id. at 3-7 to 3-24.
81. Id. at 3-25 to 3-36.
82. Id. at 3-37 to 3-42.
83. USFS & USNPS, supra note 23, at 3-1.
84. Id.
85. Robert B. Keiter, Taking Account of the Ecosystem on the Public Domain: Law and
Ecology in the Greater Yellowstone Region, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 923, 933 (1989) (discussing
ecosystem management and its implementation in the national parks through legal mechanisms).
86. USFS & USNPS, supra note 20, at 4-2.
87. Id. at 3-1.
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starting point, consider the term ecosystem. The draft Vision document defined
ecosystem as
Living organisms (biotic) together with their nonliving environment
(abiotic) forming an interacting system inhabiting a defined area of
interest. There is not an obvious boundary to separate an individual
ecosystem from its surroundings. Scientists have used the term to
refer to systems as small as an individual pond, and as large as the
planet."
At this point we find several administrative and management issues. First, and
perhaps most obvious, the document's definition created an administrative
dilemma by prescribing a management regime for an area lacking boundaries
based on scientific consensus. This criticism has also been leveled at ecosys-
tem management more generally."' Indeed, at one point the document admits
that "the actual boundaries of this area are the subject of ongoing discussion
among many parties." Second, the promise that the USFS and USNPS will
not abandon their separate and often quite distinct mandates rings rather
strangely, since potentially the most intriguing aspect, however idealistic, of
the proposal was that the USFS, at least in the Yellowstone region, was will-
ing to abandon its traditional management regime in favor of an ecosystem
regime.9 Herein lies a third issue.
The broad, almost tautological definition of ecosystem offered in the draft
Vision document is certainly consistent with current scientific conclusions
regarding the complex and interrelated structure of nature. Yet, as Keiter ar-
gues: "[Sicience itself cannot define a new ethic (or management priorities) in
an area like Greater Yellowstone. Science attaches no significance or value to
the many human interests that figure prominently in policy judgments about
the public lands." Science strives to construct a picture of the physical
world based on empirical observation. A management regime, in contrast,
must pay attention to the impact human values and interests have on allocating
meanings to scientific observations. For example, scientific observation is
supposed to remain more or less content with the conclusion that a sixteen
ounce container has eight ounces of fluid in it. From a management perspec-
tive, however, the crucial question may very well be whether the container is
"half-full" or "half-empty." It is this question which determines the appropriate
course of action-whether or not more fluid is needed or, to extend the analo-
gy, whether or not someone should stop drinking the water. The problem, of
course, is that "half-full/half-empty" are value judgments derived from the
interests of people. As such, they are open to a discourse at any given moment
and over time, unless we assume that values and interests remain constant,
88. Id. at G-2.
89. See Allan K. Fitzsimmons, Sound Policy or Smoke and Mirrors: Does Ecosystem Man-
agement Make Sense?, 32 WATER REsouRcEs BuLLEnN 217, 218 (1996) (discussing the diffi-
culty of reconciling ideas on ecosystem management with public policy concepts).
90. USFS & USNPS, supra note 51, at 1-1.
91. Id. at 4-1.
92. Keiter, supra note 85, at 1003.
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which is a difficult assumption to make in the context of ecosystem manage-
ment. Scientists, and managers who center decisions solely on science, do not
have any special position in negotiations over value questions, something
which may not be as evident a fact as it might appear.93
There was a variant of the "half-full/half-empty" dilemma at work in the
Yellowstone controversy. Consider the following passage:
The Vision, therefore, does not define resource protection and re-
source use as being mutually exclusive. Instead it introduces princi-
ples and processes that will help ensure that no matter what the re-
source use-be it the recreational needs of an individual, protection
of biological diversity for the greater good of human society, or tim-
ber harvest for national and international markets--ecosystem values
are considered first in how the resource is used.94
From a scientific standpoint, this statement is essentially accurate, because
production science and ecology are potentially compatible. Nevertheless, as a
statement of management priorities, it set the stage for confrontation rather
than compromise, because it appeared to preclude the public negotiation re-
quired above.
Once again, the broad definition of ecosystem, in combination with the
suggestion that a "measure" of naturalness was the "extent to which natural
processes... are functioning without major disruptions by humans," created
room for suspicions among some members of the public regarding the actual
outcome of ecoiystem management.9 This language could have been inter-
preted as a subtle (perhaps even covert) call for excluding increasing portions
of the GYA from traditional multiple-use activities. Whether or not such an
interpretation was "accurate" is ultimately beside the point. What is important
is that this interpretation had (and has) currency among public land interests.
Indeed, the Wyoming Legislature passed a resolution calling for the withdraw-
al of the draft Vision document. Primary among the justifications for this ac-
tion was the belief that the "[Vision] document will create a de facto Yellow-
stone National Park management philosophy on adjacent forests, diminishing
or totally excluding multiple use activities."
When placed in the context developed here, the Wyoming resolution can
be understood as multiple use advocates protesting the potential shift to a
management regime grounded in ecosystem management Another way to say
this is that multiple use advocates saw ecosystem maiagement as a negative,
while ecosystem advocates saw it as a positive. What is so important about the
protest is the currency it (and similar protests) has in the intermountain West,
an area which is seemingly central to ecosystem management. Whether the
author or readers agree or disagree with the resolution is not the point; the
93. Robert Lackey, Seven Pillars of Ecosystem Management, LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. (in
press).
94. USFS & USNPS, supra note 51, at 4-1 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 3-9.
96. H.R.J. Res. 16, 51st Leg., Gen Sess. (Wyo. 1991).
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point is that many people may well view ecosystem management as a problem
in federal land management, rather than as the solution it purports to be.
Moreover, the Vision document is not the only source of apprehension for
multiple use advocates. In the mid-1980s, a group composed primarily of
natural resource professionals in the NPS formed the Yellowstone Park Preser-
vation Council (YPPC) to counter what they believed to be a "pro-develop-
ment" bias in park management.97 A related development is the recent cre-
ation of the Association of USFS Employees for Environmental Ethics
(AFSEEE) as a protest against a perceived overemphasis on timber harvesting
in National Forest management." The point here is that the YPPC and
AFSEEE both represent outcroppings of ecosystem management within the
management agencies. It is not difficult to understand, therefore, why multiple
use advocates might view the Vision document as something more than an
effort to balance ecology and production science. They appear to pay attention
to what is said by others. To take this point further, some USFS managers
familiar with the Vision process have noted that the Greater Yellowstone Co-
alition was perceived as being very influential in the writing of the docu-
ment.99
There is one final issue, relating to both the science and management
concern, and the character of the conflict over Yellowstone, which warrants
attention. "What happens," asks former NPS official William Brown,
when park science is viewed as an end in itself rather than as a tool
of park management? When significant numbers of scientific and lay
people view certain parks primarily as scientific benchmarks, gene
pools, and relict environments of inestimable value to mankind in a
trembling biosphere?
Answering his own questions, Brown continues.
An extreme scenario might go like this: First, certain parks or seg-
ments thereof are designated ecological reserves. Second, scientific
study, not enjoyment and use, becomes the controlling purpose in
such reserves. Third, traditional park management is relieved in favor
of a science management board. m
In short, an over zealous application of ecosystem management in GYE might
alter the traditional park management regime as well as forest management. It
is clear that some in NPS see this as a desired outcome.
The broader issue here centers on the public character of the federal lands
and the agencies expressed desire to "satisfy the wishes of human soci-
97. Freemuth, supra note 21, at.
98. Pat Ford, Jeff DeBonis: 'So Far It's All Talk,' HIGH COUNTRY NEws, Feb. 26, 1990, at
1; see also Jim Stiak, Forester Challenges His Agency to a Discussion, HIGH COUNTRY NEws,
June 5, 1989, at 1 (relating the efforts of Jeff DeBonis in protecting the public domain's old-
growth forests).
99. Interview with Steve Mealey, supra note 77.
100. William Brown, Preamble Grist, GEO. WRIGHT F., at 21-22.
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ety."'' By almost any definition, the GYA is an ecosystem worth protecting.
Moreover, as the first national park and national forest in the United States,
which nonetheless has remained relatively unharmed, the GYA is an ideally
suited site for experimentation with new management techniques. The question
to be asked, however, is whether a possible narrowing of the area's use and
enjoyment by people serves the public's interest, or the interests of land man-
agers and scientists. In a related vein, was the process initiated by the draft
Vision document intended to solicit the public's perspective on the future of
the GYA, or rather intended to convince the public that the management
professionals' view should determine the GYA's future? As Benjamin Barber
has suggested, "Where there is certain knowledge, true science, or absolute
right, there is no conflict that cannot be resolved by reference to the unity of
truth, and thus there is no necessity for politics."'" Those who believe that
ecosystem management has reached the status of unchallengeable truth might
do well to pay close attention to Barber's concern.
It is apparent that the original Vision document, while very farsighted,
suggested a consensus that did not yet exist. Thus it became liable, on the one
hand, to environmentalist criticism that it lacked "clout" due to its vagueness,
and on the other hand, to multiple-use group criticism that it was too pro-envi-
ronment.' 3 illustrative of the problem is an observation made by Marshall
Gingery, assistant superintendent of Grand Teton National Park. Conceding the
likely demise of the Vision document, Gingery noted "it will still come down
to how much pressure the public will put on us to manage the right way.'
This remark suggests a possible failure to recognize that the public is not yet
willing to grant ecosystem management the status of "certain knowledge," and
therefore, there is as yet no "right" way to manage the area.
In September 1991 a revised Vision document was released. The final
Vision document was a drastic revision of the original text, having been short-
ened from over 80 pages to 10 pages. Moreover, the original goal to "Main-
tain Ecosystem Integrity"' 5 was replaced with the principle to "Maintain
Functional Ecosystems,"'" a shift predicated on the admission that "there is
more than a single ecosystem in the GYA."'' In short, this new version of-
fered a "statement of principles and guidelines to coordinate management of
the national forests and parks in the GYA," which also "reinforces the separate
missions of the USFS and NPS."' 8
101. USFS & USNPS, supra note 51, at 4-1.
102. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 129 (1984).
103. Michael Milstein, A Fading Yellowstone 'Vision,' HIGH COUNTRY NEws, June 3, 1991,
at 1.
104. Id.
105. USFS & USNPS, supra note 51, at 3-7.
106. U.S. NAT'L PARK SERV., DEP'T OF INTERIOR & U.S. FOREST SERV., DEP'T OF AGRIC., A
FRAMEWORK FOR COORDINATION OF NATIONAL PARKS AND FORESTS IN THE GREATER YELLOW-
STONE AREA 4 (1991) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK].
107. U.S. NAT'L PARK SERV., DEP'T OF INTERIOR & U.S. FOREST SERV., DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
SUMMARY OF COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT GREATER YELLOWSTONE FRAMEWORK 1 (1991) [herein-
after SUMMARY].
108. FRAMEWORK, supra note 106, at 1.
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This change in direction might be, as one disgruntled environmentalist
suggested, "another example of the industry-controlled politicians affecting the
outcome from the. agency."' ' But it might also suggest that the political pro-
cess was, at that point, functioning as it should. Indeed, a purpose of demo-
cratic and participatory politics is to make "preferences and opinions earn le-
gitimacy by forcing them to run the gauntlet of public deliberation and public
judgement.""' The revised Vision document simply acknowledged that eco-
system management had not earned legitimacy in the eyes of the public at that
point.
What occurred at Yellowstone, then, was a showdown over the political
legitimacy of ecosystem management. Consider, for example, Robert Barbee's
(Yellowstone's Superintendent), Paul Schullery's (Yellowstone environmental
specialist and journalist) and John Varley's (Yellowstone Chief of Research in
1991) thoughtful and spirited discussion of what went wrong with the Vision
process. In their view, the only players that openly endorsed the draft Vision
document were the NPS and USFS. But even that support was not complete:
"[T]hough forest supervisors and park superintendents involved were strongly
committed to the Vision, many staff members weren't."''.
Some local environmental groups endorsed the Vision process, but most of
the national groups simply "bowed politely toward the process," while refusing
to "jump in with both feet and take a major part in the dialogues.""' This is
remarkable departure from some of the strong support given ecosystem protec-
tion at the House hearings. It also reminds us of the difficulties faced by fed-
eral land managers as they attempt to offer their versions of land management
policy; most of the time they are criticized and second guessed, while rarely
being supported. In this case, lack of support may have a lot to do over the
uncertainty surrounding ecosystem management and its definition. There were
also "commodity groups of many persuasions" who mounted a "powerful
regional campaign" by convincing their members that the proposal represented
a "giant land-grab, another Federal lockup."" 3
In short, the Vision process submitted ecosystem management to public
judgement which determined that the idea, in its current form, had not yet
earned legitimacy. Aside from a relatively small group of agency personnel,
the members of the Yellowstone community were either not interested in the
principles of the draft Vision document, or openly hostile to them. To proceed
with the proposal under these conditions, therefore, would be tantamount to
turning control of the GYA over to a small group of resource professionals,
which of course is an increasingly problematic action throughout the area of
resource policy.
This assessment is based on the premise that the Yellowstone controversy
109. Dan Whipple, All Sides Fault Final 'Vision' Document, CASPER STAR TRIB., Sept. 12,
1991, at Al.
110. Barber, supra note 102, at 136.
111. Barbee et al., supra note 3, at 84.
112. Id. at 82, 85.
113. Id.
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represented a public deliberation. There is another possibility however. As
Barbee, Schullery, and Varley argue, "Public sentiment did not have a great
deal to do with the process. The American public, the owners of the parks and
foresters of the greater Yellowstone area, played virtually no role at all."
'" 4
This is a reference, of course, to the fact that "attempts to hold hearings on the
Vision in other parts of the country-far from intense local pres-
sures-failed.""5
Moreover, this view of the situation has received additional support. A
fifteen month investigation into "alleged improprieties in the directed reassign-
ments" of Lorraine Mintzmeyer and John Mumma by the Subcommittee on
the Civil Service of the U.S. House of Representatives "revealed a conspiracy
by powerful commodity and special interest groups and the Bush Administra-
tion to eviscerate the DRAFT Vision document."" 6 Some of the steps in this
"conspiracy" were "(1) closing previously planned national hearings to avoid
anticipated positive public comment; (2) employing outside groups to 'rig' the
appearance of negative public opinion at a few, select, local public meetings;
(3) maneuvering the scientific interdisciplinary team out of the revision pro-
cess, and (4) using the manufactured, negative, public comment to explain
why the revisions were allegedly necessary."' ' It might be noted, parentheti-
cally, that part of the evidence used to support these charges was the account
by Barbee, Schullery, and Varley.
Several issues emerge at this point. First, it seems that dubbing opposition
to the draft Vision document a "conspiracy" is overstating the case. For exam-
ple, Barbee, Schullery, and Varley note that the "governors of Montana, Wyo-
ming, and Idaho wrote a joint letter criticizing the process."' ' It is doubtful
that these actions were part of a conspiracy. The then governor of Idaho, Cecil
Andrus, a life-long Democrat and President Carter's Secretary of Interior,
hardly strikes one as a likely participant in any conspiracy of the Bush Admin-
istration.
Second, the suggestion that "negative public opinion" was "manufactured"
simply demonstrates a lack of understanding about the Vision process and
public land conflicts in general. The entire Vision document process confirms
that its version of ecosystem management encountered opposition from the be-
ginning. Barbee, Scullery, and Varley note that "repeated meetings ... with
mining associations and other commodity extraction groups" led inevitably to
the conclusion that "you can meet forever with opponents, and if they truly
disagree with your position, you will not change their position.""' Finally, as
noted above, anyone familiar with contemporary public land conflicts knows
114. Id. at 85.
115. Id.
116. STAFF OF REPRESENTATIVE SUBCOMM. ON THE CIVIL SERV., 99T- CONG., REPORT ON
INTERFERENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS BY POLITICAL APPOINTEES 2 (Subcomm. Print
1992).
117. Id.atl1.
118. Barbee et al., supra note 3, at 82.
119. Id. at 84-85.
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that ecology and ecosystem have often been political code words guaranteed to
meet opposition from commodity user groups. In short, if negative public
opinion was manufactured, the draft Vision document was what helped pro-
duce it.
Third, and perhaps most intriguing, the account by Barbee, Schullery, and
Varley, as well as the Subcommittee's report, contains a view of the public
which is understandable but problematic. On the one hand, if the national
parks and forests are owned by the "American public," then how can there be
"outside groups?" On the other hand, what criteria are used to determine that
opponents of the draft Vision document, which included governors and legisla-
tors as well as commodity users, are excluded from the American public?
The point here, of course, is that the political boundaries in question were
not between the "American public" and some other public, but rather between
supporters and opponents of the draft Vision document. Stated differently,
supporters understood that local hearings would be heavily populated by their
opponents. The public input during the early stages of the Vision process made
that abundantly clear. Their belief, then, was that hearings held in places out-
side of the region would be populated by interests sympathetic to the process.
If Barbee, Schullery, and Varley's assessment was an accurate reading of
the political landscape, then it was not at all clear that hearings outside of the
region would have produced different results. One of their key complaints was
that national environmental groups expressed very little interest in the propos-
al. What is missing here, then, is evidence that these groups would have been
more interested in the proposal had the hearings been held in some other loca-
tion. At the same time, given the intensity of opposition to the proposal, there
is every reason to believe that opponents might well have been "brought in by
the bus-load" wherever the hearings were held. 2
In sum, it seems that the various accounts about what went wrong with
the Vision process lead back to an earlier contention-the managers involved
simply did not understand the dynamics of public discourse. Rather than trying
to build a public consensus around the idea of ecosystem management, the
Vision process ended up playing one part of the public against other parts. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the document became the focal point of divisive-
ness and acrimony, replete with charge and countercharge about conspiracies.
We must remember that ecosystem management is a public policy idea. As
Deborah Stone reminds us about the role of ideas in political discourse
Ideas are the very stuff of politics. People fight about ideas, fight for
them, and fight against them .... Every idea about policy draws
boundaries. It tells us what or who is included or excluded in a cate-
gory. These boundaries are more than intellectual-they define people
in and out of a conflict or place them on different sides.'
Finally, the Vision process forces us to think about the role of Congress in
120. Id. at 82.
121. DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 25 (1988).
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these sorts of policy debates. The most important way that policy is legiti-
mized in the United States is when Congress passes a law after time for public
debate. Although Congress held oversight hearings on the management of the
Greater Yellowstone Area, it never gave any indication that it wished the two
federal agencies to embark on the Vision process. Should the two bureaus have
sought a clear signal from Congress, before proceeding, by trying to interest it
in ecosystem management legislation? That has certainly been tried successful-
ly in the past. Yet others might argue that USFS and NPS exercised leadership
when they developed the Vision document. Parts of the public, however,
seemed to view the Vision process as a major policy shift and have rebelled. It
has already been noted that it wasn't clear whether the two bureaus thought
what they were doing was a major change in policy direction. Was their ver-
sion of ecosystem management about process or substance, interagency coordi-
nation or a deliberate change in resource management focus? It seems clear
that without congressional support for substantive change, that change would
be impossible to sustain, and thus the only change would be that of process.
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT SINCE THE VISION DAYS
The election of Bill Clinton, in November of 1992, greatly accelerated the
adoption of ecosystem management. Vice-President Gore's National Perfor-
mance Review called for the federal government to develop a "proactive ap-
proach to ensuring a sustainable economy and a sustainable environment
through ecosystem management."'" This Administrative directive began the
federal rush towards ecosystem management, eclipsing the smaller and more
piecemeal efforts such as that around Yellowstone. Much of that effort initially
focused on the Pacific Northwest and the controversy over protecting the
spotted owl.'23 In 1993, a federal interagency ecosystem management task
force was formed to study and make recommendations concerning what would
come to be called the "ecosystem approach." This section focuses on NPS ef-
forts regarding ecosystem management, while drawing on other federal activi-
ties where important.
In September of 1994, the Ecosystem Management Working Group of the
Resource Stewardship Team of the Vail Office issued its draft report, Ecosys-
tem Management in the National Park Service. The report was one of a num-
ber issued by working groups and teams formed as a result of the Vail, Colo-
rado, meeting titled "National Parks for the 21st Century," which coincided
with the seventy-fifth anniversary of the creation of NPS in 199124
122. INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, 2 THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH:
HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES 1 (1995).
123. For two diverse but greatly informative accounts of that controversy, see STEvEN LEWIS
YAFFEE, THE WISDOM OF THE SPOTTED OWL: POLICY LESSONS FOR A NEW CENTURY (1994);
AISTON CHASE, IN A DARK WOOD: THE FIGHT OvER FORESTS AND THE RISING TYRANNY OF
ECOLOGY (1995).
124. The Vail conference resulted in a report from the Sterling Committee of the 75th An-
niversary Symposium, National Parks For The 21st Century (1992), to the Director of the Nation-
al Park Service. A number of working groups issued reports on a number of topics, including eco-
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The report defined the NPS version of ecosystem management by first
noting that because ecosystems were interconnected, bureau managers needed
to "shift from a primary park-or resource-specific approach to a wider systems
and process approach to management."'" Hence the need for ecosystem
management, which was defined as a "[lhong term approach, with the goal to
preserve, protect, and/or restore ecosystem integrity and also maintain sustain-
able societies and economies."'26 One of the key ways to ensure this would
happen was through a "fluid zone of cooperation."'27 This concept led to the
assertion that attempts to define a "definitive ecosystem boundary" were "rare-
ly constructive or useful," hence the need for multiple boundaries for multiple
ecosystem processes.
28
Herein lies a major problem which plagues ecosystem management. The
NPS assertion that clear boundary definition was unnecessary contradicts both
the Blackwater Concept discussed earlier, as well as a recent report by the
General Accounting Office (GAO), discussed below, that delineating ecosys-
tem management boundaries were a "prerequisite" for planning, budgeting,
and so forth."2 This is no mere quibble, and may lie at the core of problems
in both defining and implementing ecosystem management.
Boundary definition is stunningly problematic. For example, parts of east-
ern Idaho fall into both the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem and the Upper
Columbia River Basin Ecosystem, which residents of this area would seeming-
ly wish reconciled. The acreage of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem alone
has been identified as being from 5 to 19 million acres, depending on which
group is doing the reporting.
Allan Fitzsimmons has remarked on the differences between USFS, U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, and Environmental Protection Agency ecosystem
maps. He notes the observation of Bruce Hannon that "the delimitation of the
system is strictly at the discretion of the observer, i.e. the system boundaries
and the list of internal elements may be chosen at will."'30 It is hard to see
how much public support can be expected for ecosystem management when
there is fundamental disagreement over whether or not one needs definable
and clearly fixed boundaries for ecosystems, or whether there even are clearly
defined ecosystems which are agreed upon. Also, given widespread public
distrust of the federal government, the power given federal "observers" to
define things in whatever way they may wish might create even more backlash
system management.
125. NAT'L PARK SERV., ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT WORKING GROUP OF THE RESOURCE
STEWARDSHIP TEAM, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN THE NAT'L PARK SERV. 5 (1994).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 11.
128. Id.
129. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT- ADDITIONAL ACTIONS
NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY TEST A PROMISING APPROACH, at 32 (1994), available in 1994 WL
810514.
130. Fitzsimmons, supra note 89, at 218 (quoting Bruce Hannon, Accounting in Ecological
Systems, in ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY 234,
238 (Robert Costanza ed., 1991)).
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once the uncertainty of key principles of ecosystem management becomes
widely understood.
Recently, the USFS definition of ecosystem management added to the
uncertainly by pointing to the need for defined boundaries using the phrase
"defined area or region of interest" in the bureau definition.1 3 1 Again, one is
tempted to ask--defined by whom, using what criteria-while at the same
time noting that USFS is arguing that definition is important. The N P S
report had several other important orientations. The first continued a growing
trend in NPS which recognizes that park resources are impacted from sources
and activities internal and external to park units. Second, the call for more
research and monitoring extended another trend which has been growing over
the past few years. Third, the report acknowledged that park units were human
constructs (Congress creates national parks, they are not "natural"), as well as
part of a larger world with human and nonhuman components.
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT ON THE GROUND
NPS claims to have applied what it terms "ecosystem management princi-
ples" in a number of areas, although the final bureau ecosystem management
report is apparently still being written."' It is not clear what the bureau
means by the claim as yet, given the continued lack of clarity concerning the
definition of ecosystem management. What appears implied by the assertion,
however, is more cooperation and sharing of information and concerns, both
within the NPS, and between NPS and other entities-governmental and other-
wise. For example, NPS reported on park units in the Colorado Plateau region
of the West, where better coordination and sharing of information and research
data are being actively promoted. Whether that sharing of information is eco-
system management or just better intra-agency communication is an interesting
question, and worth consideration. If ecosystem management turns out to real-
ly be about coordination, sharing of information and so forth, it is hard to see
how anyone can be opposed. But, that said, what remains unclear are whether
ecosystem management is anything more.
The report of the Vail ecosystem management working group provides a
number of regional examples of ecosystem management. It notes that two
regions of concern to NPS, South Florida and the Southern Appalachians, are
"sharing budget plans" and "coordinating closely on planning projects.' 33
Again, this report suggests more of a process change where bureaus cooperate
more than they have before, while the substance of policy outcome remains
unclear.
131. See U.S. FOREST SERV. & BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, SUMMARY OF THE DRAFT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE UPPER COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 16 (1997) (stating
that ecosystems can be "viewed as organized within a hierarchy, with each level having a variety
of time and space scales"). The phrase "defined area or region of interest" was noted in an unpub-
lished document located at the office of the Upper Columbia River Basin Assessment Team pro-
ject office in Boise, Idaho.
132. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 129, at 4-5.
133. INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, supra note ?, at 8.
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A key reason for some of the institutional "slowness," however, does not
have much to do with a lack of understanding of ecosystem management. NPS
has just completed a major reorganization effort, while at the same time com-
plying with numerous Administration/management directives such as Total
Quality Management 34 and the National Performance Review.'35 The ef-
fects of increasing "management-by-buzzword" demands placed on federal
bureaus like NPS, by Administrations of both political parties, are something
which deserves much more attention. As one example, it is not clear how the
personnel and budgets cuts brought about by the National Performance Review
have been meshed with the ecosystem management policies of the current
administration. That is, all federal bureaus with environmental protection re-
sponsibilities are being asked to do more with less resources.'36 Often those
resources include the loss of personnel with political and administrative expe-
rience who could have helped with the implementation of ecosystem manage-
ment. Public bureaus appear to spend an increasing amount of time complying
with the new management initiatives, rather than concentrating on core areas
of bureau mission requirements; in this case, managing parks.
An examination of one these new management initiatives, this time from
Congress, shows how difficult it may to be for NPS to implement ecosystem
management, as it is currently understood, and to mesh it with other require-
ments. In 1993, Congress passed the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993 (GPRA);' NPS is one of several "pilot" bureaus attempting to
implement the Act. GPRA is a congressional mandate to link the mission of a
bureau to outcome-related goals, how the goals will be achieved, and program
evaluations of whether the goals are achieved or not. 31 For example, one
goal of the NPS mission has already been interpreted through GPRA proce-
dures as "protect park resources."'39 From this goal statement, a number of
park unit-specific actions that can be documented and evaluated through bud-
gets, quantitative measures of performance, and so on, are supposed to follow.
The congressional intent of the GPRA is to measure and evaluate outcomes
rather than outputs."4 In this example, one would evaluate "results"-was a
resource protected-rather than "processes" (money spent, personnel activities,
and so on).
134. Quality Envtl. Mgmt. Subcomm., President's Commission on Environmental Quality,
Total Quality Management: A Framework for Pollution Prevention (1993) (creating a task force
by Clinton Administration).
135. AL GORE, THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CRE-
ATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BErrER AND COSTS LESS (1993) (directing all agencies to
implement ecosystem management).
136. This is a rather common, yet anonymous, complaint of officials in NPS and other bu-
reaus.
137. Government Peformance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285
(1993).
138. Id. §§ 2, 3, 4.
139. U.S. Nat'l Park Serv., GRPA-izing the NPS Strategic Plan (1995) (unpublished NPS
document).
140. Government Performance and Results Act, § 2(b)(3).
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There are, of course, problems with the GPRA. In the field of education,
we might term this the "teach the test problem." Let us suppose a Board of
Education mandated a similar approach to measuring teacher success by re-
quiring a certain percentage of students to score above the seventieth percen-
tile on a standardized test. If the percentage is not reached then the teacher has
not met the required outcome measure. One way for a teacher to increase the
percentage would be to spend a lot of time focusing on passing the test by
essentially teaching the test to students. We would likely be able to see a high-
er student success rate, but we would have no way of knowing whether the
students were actually better educated. More fundamentally, it has never been
clear that tests can measure all attributes of an education, or that what is mea-
sured is what ought to be, but cannot be, measured. Thus, NPS might find
ways to measure certain attributes of resource protection, but will that be be-
cause those attributes are easier to quantify?
These outcome measures are all actions that look as though they are under
NPS management control. Cross boundary issues and actions related to them,
such as air pollution, may also be able to be documented, but they relate to
another aspect of GPRA, as well. Under that act, each federal bureau is to
have a plan which, among other things has an "identification of those key
factors external to the agency and beyond its control that could significantly
affect the achievement of the general goals and objectives" (such as protecting
park resources).'4' This is clearly a fortuitous time for NPS to document
more clearly what aspects of protecting park resources are beyond bureau con-
trol, since this law requires such documentation. NPS should seize this oppor-
tunity to clarify the scope and extent of the "external threats"' problem, an
action which might help clarify what is or is not resolvable by the principles
of ecosystem management. Yet what is most striking about how NPS is
dealing with this new law is how bureau action compares with ecosystem
management efforts. The "cooperative" or "collaborative" aspects of ecosys-
tem management may not fit well with the GPRA. NPS training materials
have already interpreted actions such as "forge strong collaborative relations
with all partners and integrate them in all operations" as not appropriate
GPRA goal criteria.'42 Compare this statement with the following one from
the NPS ecosystem management document which is also very similar to some
government-wide ecosystem management definitions: "Ecosystem Management
is a collaborative approach to natural and cultural resource manage-
,,143ment ....
By GPRA standards, it is hard to show how such collaboration has been
accomplished, and what the measurable outcomes would be. The difficult
question for NPS is whether it ought to spend more time on process (collabo-
ration) or on results (outcomes), because Congress has asked one thing and the
141. 5 U.S.C. § 306(a)(5) (1994) (emphasis added).
142. U.S. Nat'l Park Serv., Examples of Goals Not Meeting GRPA Criteria (1997) (internal
NPS document).
143. ECOSYSTEM, supra note 125, at 3.
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Clinton Administration, another. Yet, until a better definition of ecosystem
management is achieved, it may make sense for NPS to pay more attention to
GPRA. There are several reasons why the bureau might wish to do so. First,
there is a growing critique of ecosystem management from a number of direc-
tions and perspectives, which illustrates that the term is amorphous and some-
what questionable scientifically. '" Allan Fitzsimmons has made the follow-
ing scathing observation about the USFS's 1995 rule calling for the implemen-
tation of ecosystem management throughout the forest system. The
rule calls for the Forest Service to oversee the National Forest System
in order to sustain undefined conditions on undefined landscape units
that exist in limitless numbers in undefined locations and that are
dynamic and constantly changing over time and space in unclear
ways.... This is an unintelligible bias for managing the National
Forest System.
Put simply, because of fundamental vagueness in key parts of its definition,
ecosystem management is becoming a target, and one possibility would be to
move slightly and subtly away from the line of fire, rather than spend inordi-
nate bureau resources and energies trying to define and implement a policy
that many view as both ill-defined and without necessary public support at this
time.
Second, the GPRA, while flawed, sets out a process that appears a bit
more specific; a process that the bureau as well as its interested public might
be able to use to get a better understanding of what actually is being valued,
as well as accomplished, by NPS. GPRA might even provide NPS a means to
define what it means by ecosystem management and how the bureau will mea-
sure whether ecosystem management is successful. Given the huge public
disagreement over the goals and purposes of much of the federal estate, this
understanding would be no mean accomplishment.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Ecosystem management may be an idea whose time came, began to pros-
per, and then came under severe criticism, all in short order. The initial days
of ecosystem management seemed much like other periods of policy develop-
ment in the United States. In this case, land managers, resource managers and
scientists, and scholars began to explore new ways to think about and manage
the resources under their care. Ecosystem management was, at that point, an
idea about federal land and resource management which, while exciting, need-
ed more refinement before being implemented.
Then came the Yellowstone experiment analyzed above. It would be fair
to characterize the Yellowstone effort as a policy experiment, one that perhaps
"failed," yet at the same provided much information about how one might try
such a thing the next time. In other words, policy learning could have led to
144. See generally CHASE, supra note 81; LACKEY, supra note 51.
145. FITZSIMMONS, supra note 47, at 221.
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policy refinement. But then other events intervened, and ecosystem manage-
ment hit the policy "fast track" with the Clinton Administration. Bureau learn-
ing opportunities were lost in this orchestrated environment.
Analysis of Clinton Administration efforts leads to some puzzling ques-
tions. First, it remains unclear what ecosystem management actually is, and
whether it is more about changes in bureau decision processes or decision
outcomes. The current definition of ecosystem management is both vague and
process-oriented. As was already mentioned, any policy that would ensure
inter-bureau coordination and communication is laudable and uncontroversial.
The logic of such a position implies that more could be done, but it is unlikely
that a fundamental reorganization of the federal land management bureaus will
take place. Although many have asked whether it is essential that the United
States have four land bureaus, the political capital needed to effect that sort of
change is hard to come by.
What remains unanswered is whether or not ecosystem management will
lead to changes in policy. On the one hand, federal officials constantly refer to
the "integration" of economic, social and environmental goals. Yet on the
other hand, we are warned by other advocates of ecosystem management to
avoid giving equal weight to economic and environmental goals. In the words
of Ed Grumbine, "[wie must avoid the democratic trap of giving equal weight
to all interest groups: many would destroy biodiversity for short-term econom-
ic gain."'" Understandably, such a stance makes many people nervous about
the real goals of ecosystem management, even if federal officials rightly deny
that they hold such views. Grumbine's position once again assumes the stance
of ultimate "truth" which denies the need for democratic discourse, a stance
warned against earlier by Benjamin Barber. What remains unclear are whether
ecosystem management implies a "trumping" of resource use by resource pro-
tection, and whether the American public has acquiesced in such a policy
change.
It remains unclear how ecosystem management will benefit NPS
decisionmaking. Park management issues coalesce around the proper balance
between visitor enjoyment and resource protection, and the appropriate level of
visitor services which will also leave park resources available for the enjoy-
ment of future visitors. The heady goals of balancing cultural socioeconomic
and ecological systems are absurdly overdrawn for the real management ques-
tions facing NPS. Paradoxically, the balancing of goals creates the opportunity
for economic interests to argue that parks should do more to contribute to the
economic well-being of the "system" they are in. Perhaps what is most need-
ed-though not likely to happen-is a long period where federal bureaus like
NPS are spared from any more management buzzwords until they are able to
deal with their core missions. Superintendent Barbee's testimony at the 1985
House hearings noted that ecosystem management was something federal land
146. FrrZSIMMONS, supra note 89, at 220 (quoting Edward Grumbine, Protecting Biological




managers were going to have to deal with. 47 At the same time, he felt that
the concept was somewhat questionable as management tool. These are sound
observations. Perhaps we need to think about ecosystem management more
than we have.
147. Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands
and the Subcomm. on Nat'l Parks and Recreation of the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 99-18 (1985) (statement of Robert D. Barbee, Superintendent, Yellowstone
Nat'l Park).
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